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Abstract
This paper proposes an approach to compute and decompose cost efficiency
in contexts where units can adjust input quantities and seek input prices so
that through the joint determination of quantities and prices they can min-
imise the aggregate cost of the outputs they secure. The models developed
are based on the data envelopment analysis framework and can accommodate
situations where the degree of influence over prices is minimal, and situations
where there is a large influence over prices. When units cannot influence in-
put prices the models proposed reduce to the standard cost efficiency, where
prices are taken as exogenous. In addition to the cost model, we introduce
a novel decomposition of cost efficiency into a quantity and a price compo-
nent, based on Bennet indicators. The components are expressed in terms
of percentage cost savings that can be attained through changing prices and
changing quantities towards the overall optimum cost target.
Keywords: Cost efficiency; price efficiency, Bennet Indicators, Data Envelop-
ment Analysis
1 Introduction
Traditional models for computing cost and revenue efficiency date back to Farrell
(1957) and will be called Farrell cost or revenue efficiency models. Since the appear-
ance of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) in 1978 (see Charnes et al. (1978)) cost
efficiency and revenue efficiency have been computed through linear programming
1Correspondence: Maria Conceic¸a˜o A. Silva Portela , Faculdade de Economia e Gesta˜o
da Universidade Cato´lica Portuguesa, Rua Diogo Botelho, 4169-005 Porto, Portugal. E-mail:
csilva@porto.ucp.pt, Tel. +351226196200
1
models, when an option for the use of non-parametric models is taken. The alter-
native is to compute cost or revenue efficiency based on the definition of parametric
revenue functions or cost functions like the Cobb Douglas function or the translog
function (see e.g. Greene (2008)). In both cases, the underlying economic model of
the firm typically assumes that it operates in a competitive market, where prices of
inputs and outputs are exogenously given, often taken at the level of actual prices
observed at the operating decision making unit (DMU). As a result, cost efficiency
and revenue efficiency reflect cost savings or revenue gains that can accrue from
changes in input or output quantities given their (fixed) prices. Units where input
or output prices are exogenously fixed are said to be price takers.
In this paper we depart from the notion of production units being price takers
and consider the case where the units to be assessed for cost or revenue efficiency
either can influence to some extent the input or output prices they secure and/or
could secure prices other than those they actually did even if they do not influence
their levels directly themselves. This in turn means that such production units can
improve their cost or revenue efficiency by inter alia securing better prices for their
inputs and/or outputs. We focus on cost efficiency in this paper, but the extension
of the proposed approach to revenue efficiency is straightforward.
Modelling economic efficiency in situations where units are not price takers has
been addressed before, but mainly in a context of endogenous prices (i.e. the
level of outputs of a DMU are assumed to impact the price per unit of
output, so that maximum output levels may not necessarily be compatible
with maximum revenue). In such contexts prices are said to be endogenous to
the unit. For example, Cherchye et al. (2002) considered a situation of endogenous
and uncertain prices, while Johnson and Ruggiero (2011) considered the situation of
endogenous prices. On the other hand, Kuosmanen and Post (2002) considered just
the situation of price uncertainty. Price endogeneity as modelled hitherto has relied
on some explicit functional form e.g. between output quantities and corresponding
output prices. We depart in this paper from this modelling paradigm for two reasons.
Firstly, to deal with situations where markets are not competitive and demand
functions are not known, and secondly even if the markets are perfectly competitive
the units concerned may not be able to access the fully competitive prices which in
any case may not necessarily be explicitly known.
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We would argue that prices manifested at unit level apart from endogeneity or
exogeneity as the case may be, also incorporate an element of managerial efficiency
and local factors, which can make the task of predicting prices attainable at unit
level very difficult. That is, whether prices are endogenous or exogenous the ability
of a unit to secure optimal prices reflects, to an extent, also the unit’s ability to
assess the pricing context in which it is operating and take appropriate action to
optimise the prices it secures. In this context we take the prices manifested across
the DMUs as the best available evidence of prices that can be secured, and we
replicate in the context of input prices what is done for input-output levels in a
non parametric context of efficiency measurement. In traditional DEA models no
assumption is made of the functional relationship between input and output levels.
The production possibility set is built with reference to observed input-output level
correspondences using certain assumptions (eg. Thanassoulis et al. (2008, p.255)).
In the same manner in this paper we use observed input prices to derive input prices
that are in principle attainable by DMUs. The larger the number of DMUs within
a ’pricing environment’ the better the prices attainable by DMUs will be revealed.
To see how manifested input prices can incorporate some component of ineffi-
ciency, even in competitive markets, consider the case of a number of hypothetical
hospitals in a given large city each one looking to hire a doctor of the same skills at
the same point in time. It is by no means certain what the theoretically minimum
salary at which such a doctor can be hired is. The salary each hospital will end
up paying to each doctor recruited will to some extent depend on the negotiating
skills of the candidate and of the employer, on whether the post was over or under
specified relative to the skills actually needed and on externalities such as location
of the post relative to a candidate’s residence, perceived culture of the employer etc.
Similarly, in a banking context, where input prices can be interest paid on deposits,
the ability of management to devise financial products in terms of the interplay of
interest rate and withdrawal or other restrictions will affect the rate at which a bank
can secure funds, whether or not there is a free competitive banking market. Thus
different banks drawing funds from the same pool of savings can secure funds at
different rates in effect meaning securing inputs at different prices. In both these
examples the actual salaries for doctors paid or the interest rates secured by banks
offer us the best available empirical evidence of the prices that might have been
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attainable. As in the case of input levels that can secure given output levels, in
the case of prices too, the more the units in the comparative set the more likely we
are to observe the most favourable prices that could have been secured in a given
operating context.
Thus in this paper we address situations where units are not strictly input price
takers and prices secured reflect inter alia managerial effectiveness in securing op-
timal prices for their inputs. We argue that when the performance of such units is
assessed, managerial ability to arrive simultaneously at an optimal price and quan-
tity mix so as to minimise costs should be captured. We develop a cost model for
the simultaneous optimisation of input quantities and prices. Such a model requires
that data on prices and quantities are available, and assumes that DMUs have some
degree of influence both over prices and over quantities of inputs.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we review literature that is
more directly related with the work developed in this paper, and will further address
the motivations of the paper. In section 3 we propose a new model for computing
cost efficiency and show how to decompose this measure in section 4. In section 5 an
illustrative example is shown highlighting the differences between ours and existing
approaches for computing price efficiency. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Economic efficiency in non-competitive markets
Consider for each DMU j (j = 1, ..., n) a vector xj = (x1j,x2j, ...,xmj) reflectingm
inputs consumed for producing a vector of s outputs yj = (y1j,y2j, ...ysj). Consider
also, that observed prices of inputs at DMUj are known and given by a vector
pj = (p1j,p2j, ...,pmj). Observed aggregate cost of inputs for a given unit o is
Co =
∑m
i=1 pioxio. The Farrell cost efficiency model for DMUo is the solution of the
linear program in (1), where input quantities, xi, and the intensity variables, λj, are
taken as the decision variables and prices are considered exogenous (see e.g. Fa¨re et
al. (1985)).
min
λj ,xi
{
C =
m∑
i=1
pio xi |
n∑
j=1
λjxij ≤ xi, i = 1, ...,m ,
n∑
j=1
λjyrj ≥ yro, r = 1, ..., s, λj, xi ≥ 0
}
(1)
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The optimal solution to model (1) yields the minimum cost (C∗), at which DMUo
can secure at least its output levels when input prices are taken as given. The model
in (1), also yields the optimal input quantities (x∗i ) which support the outputs of
DMUo at the minimum cost (C
∗). Cost efficiency is defined as the ratio of the
minimum cost to the observed cost (C∗/Co ).
Traditionally reduction in costs is prescribed in two ways taken in sequence:
(i) reducing the quantities of inputs pro-rata to reach the minimum input levels
capable of supporting the outputs; (ii) changing the mix of inputs so that, given
the prevailing input prices, aggregate input costs are minimised. The technical
efficiency (computed using the standard DEA model of Charnes et al. (1978) ) of a
unit reflects its scope for savings through (i) and its allocative efficiency is reflected
through (ii).
Usually minimum cost models are computed under constant returns to scale
(CRS), as in (1), but both the cost and the technical efficiency measure can also
be computed under variable returns to scale VRS (see e.g. Fa¨re et al. (1994) and
Athanassopoulos and Gounaris (2001)).
Tone (2002) noted that the Farrell cost model does not capture the full extent
of cost savings, as the cost efficiency (C∗/Co ) of two DMUs may be equal, even if
one faces double the input prices of the other (as long as both show the same levels
of inputs and outputs). In essence, if prices are truly exogenous this outcome is
acceptable, since both DMUs use the same mix of inputs for the prevailing input
prices, notwithstanding the fact that one of the DMUs has to pay twice as much
for its inputs as the other. In a reply to Tone (2002), Fa¨re and Grosskopf (2006)
propose the use of a difference form of cost efficiency, rather than a ratio form,
to solve the problem. Such a difference form is based on the notion of directional
distance functions and implies the use of a common normalisation factor. In spite
of apparently solving the problem, the approach of Fa¨re and Grosskopf (2006),
provides for two DMUs employing the same quantities of inputs to produce the same
quantities of outputs the same technical inefficiency, but an allocative inefficiency
that is for one DMU double that of the other, when input prices are also double.
However, this allocative inefficiency does not reflect what is traditionally reflected
by an allocative efficiency component (i.e. the extent to which the mix of inputs
needs to be changed given the prevailing input prices) since the mix changes in
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inputs are exactly the same for both DMUs. Such allocative inefficiency is in fact
reflecting price differences, which the units are assumed not to control, and therefore
this component should be ignored on the cost inefficiency measurement.
Clearly, if one assumes, as we argue, that production units have some degree of
influence over input prices either because of an uncompetitive market and/or because
they can fail to secure optimal prices that may have been available, then this should
be taken into account when measuring cost efficiency. Indeed it could be argued that
even if units have no control over prices they may still be interested in knowing the
extent to which they fail to reach minimum cost due to suboptimal prices as distinct
from technical inefficiency. In this case, such component of inefficiency should
not be called allocative inefficiency (as in Fa¨re and Grosskopf (2006)), but
should be called price inefficiency. Tone and Tsutsui (2007), following Tone
(2002), proposed a decomposition of cost efficiency into technical, allocative and
price efficiency. The price efficiency component of Tone and Tsutsui (2007) reflects
the scope for savings through input price changes, whereas allocative efficiency is
defined as “the adjustment to the optimal cost mix, viz., the combination of the
optimal input amount and input price mixture” (Tone and Tsutsui (2007) , p. 95).
These two concepts in the Tone and Tsutsui (2007) model are mis-specified, as
allocative efficiency is unrelated to its traditional meaning and price efficiency does
not capture entirely the changes in prices as we will see later. (see also Sahoo and
Tone (2013) for a recent application).
Camanho and Dyson (2008) also addressed the situation of non-competitive mar-
kets where prices can be negotiated rather than imposed by a theoretical market
equilibrium. Their approach, starts by the computation of the traditional Farrell
cost efficiency measure and its decomposition into technical and allocative compo-
nents, and then identifies a third component called ‘market efficiency’. This com-
ponent is identified by solving the traditional cost efficiency model under different
price assumptions (one of which is the assumption that the minimum price observed
on each input can be attained by all DMUs, and another is that each DMU can
choose from the set of observed price vectors the one that minimises the aggregate
cost of inputs for their output bundle ). Ray et al. (2008) also proposed a related
method for modelling situations where firms can choose their location depending on
the input prices offered in each location. The main novelty in the Ray et al. (2008)
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model is that it considers the possibility of partially producing an output bundle
from an input bundle in different locations and at different prices.
A related strand of the literature is that dealing with price uncertainty or incom-
plete price information. Such literature generally makes use of the dual of technical
efficiency measures, since it is well known in economics that the Farrell technical ef-
ficiency can be interpreted as a cost minimisation model under the most favourable
shadow prices. To see this, consider the dual of model (1), shown in (2), where vi
are the input shadow prices and ur are the output shadow prices.
max
ur,vi
{ s∑
r=1
ur yro | −
m∑
i=1
vixij +
s∑
r=1
uryrj ≤ 0, j = 1, ..., n , vi ≤ pio, vi, ur ≥ 0
}
(2)
At the optimal solution of model (1) the variables xi are basic variables (as
xi ≥
∑n
j=1 λjxij) and therefore the corresponding constraints (vi ≤ pio) in the dual
(2) are binding, meaning that all input weights or shadow prices are equal to observed
input prices (vi = pio). If observed prices pio cannot be known, but some
information on prices is available (e.g. the price of input 1 is more than
the double of that of input 2) model (1) cannot be used, but its dual
(2) can be used by replacing constraints (vi ≤ pio) by other constraints
reflecting the price information available for inputs (e.g. v1 ≥ 2v2). Such
additional constraints will led to a solution that is an approximation to
the economic efficiency measure in (1). The dual of the Debreu-Farrell model
of technical efficiency is similar to (2), but the shadow price constraints (vi ≤ pio)
are replaced by a price normalisation constraint
∑m
i=1 vixio = 1. This constraint
is obviously less strict and allows a wide range of choice in optimal shadow prices,
rather than equating them to observed prices. Therefore, the technical efficiency
measure can be seen as an upper bound of cost efficiency (see e.g. Russell (1985) or
Leleu (2013)). Several authors have used this approach to model economic efficiency,
such as Camanho and Dyson (2005), Cherchye et al. (2002) or Kuosmanen et al.
(2010), where price uncertainty has been modelled through constraints imposed on
the shadow prices in model (2). (2) is specified in ’price space’ and shadow prices are
the decision variables to this model. Since we also use prices as decision variables,
this strand of the literature is related to ours. However, optimisation of shadow prices
differs from optimisation of observed prices, which is what we pursue in this paper
7
(note that we assume that observed prices can be changed or optimised,
and therefore are not exogeneous). In fact shadow price optimization, should
be attempted when price information is incomplete or unavailable. When price
information is available, one can optimise over observed prices, if one assumes that
DMUs have some degree of influence over the input prices they face. Therefore based
on two assumptions: that data on observed input prices are available and that DMUs
can to some extent influence them, we depart from existing cost efficiency models
in two fundamental ways. Firstly we allow quantities of inputs and input prices
to vary simultaneously, and secondly we decompose cost efficiency so as to capture
separately the savings due to exploiting input quantity changes and those due to
exploiting input price flexibility. We argue this decomposition is more appropriate
when there is input price flexibility rather than the notion of allocative efficiency used
for example in Camanho and Dyson (2008). In fact traditional allocative efficiency
is not very meaningful when one assumes that there is an optimum level for prices,
and that units can make efforts to change prices accordingly to this optimum level.
3 A cost efficiency model when input quantities
and their prices can vary simultaneously
The new cost minimisation model proposed in this paper is in all respects similar
to the Farrell cost model in (1) except that it assumes each DMU is not a price taker,
but rather it could have in principle availed itself of input prices other than those it
actually paid. Under this scenario a modification of model (1) is needed to the form
depicted in (3).
In (3) decision variables reflect changes in observed levels of inputs (θi), changes
in observed levels of prices (γi), and the intensity variables associated to DMUj, as
in traditional DEA models. We also introduce the decision variables zij, the ijth
being associated with price i observed at DMUj. This set of additional intensity
variables, as will be explained shortly, makes it possible to arrive at a set of input
prices that might have been available to the DMU being assessed, by using the data
on input prices that have been observed across the set of DMUs. Thus the new set
of intensity variables zij play a similar role to that of the intensity variables λj albeit
in respect of input prices rather than input-output levels.
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min
γi,θi,λj ,zij
{
C =
m∑
i=1
γipio θixio |
n∑
j=1
λjxij ≤ θixio, i = 1, ...,m,
n∑
j=1
λjyrj ≥ yro, r = 1, ..., s,
n∑
j=1
zij pij ≤ γipio, i = 1, ...,m
n∑
j=1
zij = 1, i = 1, ...,m, zij, λj, θi, γi ≥ 0
}
(3)
The model in (3) is non-linear in the objective function in that the sum of the
product of input quantities and prices is minimised (note that θixio can be replaced
by a single variable xi and that γipio could be replaced by a variable pi). In this
manner input prices and quantities are optimised simultaneously. Model (3) has two
types of constraints: those defining feasible input-output correspondences and those
defining feasible input prices.
The feasible input-output correspondences in model (3) are the same as those
in model (1), defining the production possibility set in the traditional DEA model
under CRS, (though this can be readily modified for VRS technologies by adding
the convexity constraint
∑n
j=1 λj = 1).
The constraints on prices
∑n
j=1 zij pij ≤ γipio, i = 1, ...,m and
∑n
j=1 zij = 1, i =
1, ...,m state that the feasible in principle price for each input would be a convex
combination of observed prices for that input (pi ≥
∑n
j=1 zij pij). The rationale
behind the price constraints is that the best guide we have of input prices available
to DMUs are those that have been observed.
The optimal solution from model (3) renders input quantity targets (x∗i = θ
∗
i xio),
price targets (p∗i = γ
∗
i pio), benchmarks for input-output quantities (all units j whose
λj > 0), and benchmarks for each input price i, (all units j whose zij > 0). Note
that in this general formulation, we assume that referent DMUs for optimal input
prices do not need to be the same for all inputs nor do they need to be the same
as the benchmarks for technically efficient input-output levels. That is, there is no
reason to assume that a unit with scope for savings would need to emulate the same
peer units for input prices as for transforming inputs to outputs. Further, even if the
same benchmarks are found for both input to output transformations and for input
price emulation, the intensities with which they form the virtual comparator unit
need not be the same in both cases. In standard DEA a virtual unit is formed using
the same intensities (λj) for inputs and outputs, as there is a causal correspondence
between input and output quantities. Such causal correspondence is not assumed in
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model (3) between input prices and input or output quantities. However, in cases
of endogeneity (e.g. where input price advantages may be secured through volume
purchases) additional constraints can be placed in model (3) linking the volume
of input of the virtual comparator unit with the input prices feasible in principle.
Indeed other prior information about constraints on available prices for one or more
inputs can be included in model (3), if available. However, again for reasons of
simplicity we avoid at this stage refinements of this type to focus on the departure
from the traditional price taker modelling approach prevailing so far in the literature.
The optimal solution to model (3) is in fact a trivial one, as far as prices are
concerned. Optimum prices in (3) are the minimum observed prices for each input.
Thus in a sense the model in (3) is equivalent to the approach in Camanho and
Dyson (2008) where they directly opt to use the minimum observed price for each
input as the basis for computing the cost efficiency of each unit in the framework of
the traditional cost model (1). However, this is only so for the least restricted case
on input prices as depicted in model (3). Model (3) is to be seen as a generic one,
where the Farrell cost efficiency model and the approaches developed by Camanho
and Dyson (2008) are special cases. Our formulation in (3) can yield the same
results as the Farrell cost efficiency model (1) when we set γi = 1 for all i. In this
case the constraints on prices would become
∑n
j=1 zijpij ≤ pio, and this would be
redundant (as for the unit under assessment zio can be set to 1 without violating
any constraints). On the other hand, if we assume input prices are related across
inputs so that only convex combination of the vectors of observed prices rather
than of individual input prices are feasible, then model (3) can be modified by
using intensity variables zj, instead of zij. This modification will identify one of the
observed vectors of input prices as optimal as was the case in one of the approaches
recommended by Camanho and Dyson (2008).
Thus the model in (3) can be seen as the most general model in which optimal
input quantities and prices are to be determined ranging from the case where input
prices are fixed and only optimal quantities are to be determined, to the case where
there are in effect no restrictions on input prices other than they should be higher
than some convex combination of observed prices, in which case the lowest observed
price on each input is optimal. Restrictions on individual prices or combinations
of prices can be readily accommodated in (3) depending on context. We illustrate
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here one simple restriction which we would expect to be valid in many real life
cases. It would be reasonable to assume that a DMU has on going relationships
with suppliers. Thus, the convex combination of observed prices on an input within
model (3) should be further restricted so that DMUo could not be expected to secure
input prices too far removed from those it has secured in the past, at least not in
the short term. The scope for potential reductions in input prices would be decision
maker supplied or drawn from the experience of reductions in input prices other
DMUs may have secured. Model (3) can be readily modified to cope with this type
of restriction by adding the constraint γi ≥ αi where αi is a user-defined scalar
between 0 and 1 providing a lower bound for the level of the price of input i at
DMUo.
We conclude this section by noting that the above model is non-linear, requiring
the use of advanced non linear programming solvers for obtaining a solution that is
a global optimum. Developments in the field of non-linear programming have now
reached a certain level of maturity (see Pinte´r (2007)) which permits the solution
of models such as (3) to identify a global optimal solution. Traditional solvers that
could only guarantee local optimal solutions to non-linear models are being replaced
by more efficient solvers which perform global scope searches and can reach global or
very close to global optimal solutions. In Pinte´r (2007) the authors explain the use
of a Gams solver LGO to solve non-linear models and illustrate the performance of
this solver. Given the large availability of solver options in e.g. Gams indeed trying
more than one solver is the best option to guarantee obtaining, or being close to
the global optimal solution.
4 Decomposing the cost efficiency measure when
units are not input price takers
Through model (3) a cost efficiency measure can be computed as the ratio be-
tween minimum cost and observed cost. Such a ratio is traditionally decomposed into
technical and allocative efficiency measures, but such a decomposition lacks meaning
when both prices and quantities are decision variables. As noted earlier, the decom-
positions proposed in previous attempts to model non-competitive markets (such
as the Camanho and Dyson (2008) or the Tone and Tsutsui (2007) approaches),
11
are in our view ill-defined in a context where both prices and quantities can vary
simultaneously to minimise costs. We propose instead to identify the components
of cost savings attributable to input price changes and those attributable to input
quantity changes making use of price and quantity indicators as defined in Balk, et
al. (2004) and Diewert (2005). Such indicators are usually defined in temporal anal-
yses, where cost or revenue change over time is decomposed into volume and price
change (see Diewert (2005)). We follow a similar procedure in our decomposition of
cost efficiency, but comparing observed versus optimal quantities and prices.
Model (3) yields the minimum cost value (C∗) and the corresponding optimal
quantity and price targets. The ratio between minimum cost and observed cost is
our measure of cost efficiency (CE):
CE =
C∗
Co
=
∑m
i=1 θ
∗
i γ
∗
i xiopio∑m
i=1 xiopio
(4)
This ratio cannot be readily disentangled into quantity and price contributions to
aggregate potential savings because these vary by input. We can compute, however,
a cost inefficiency measure (1- CE) reflecting the percentage of observed aggregate
input costs which can be saved through adopting the target input prices (p∗io = γ
∗
i pio)
and quantities (x∗io = θ
∗
i xio) for each unit o. This can be expressed as:∑m
i=1 xiopio −
∑m
i=1 x
∗
iop
∗
io∑m
i=1 xiopio
= 1−
∑m
i=1 x
∗
iop
∗
io∑m
i=1 xiopio
= 1− CE (5)
This can be decomposed into:
∑m
i=1 xiopio −
∑m
i=1 x
∗
iop
∗
io∑m
i=1 xiopio
=
∑m
i=1 (xio − x∗io)p∗io∑m
i=1 xiopio
+
∑m
i=1 (pio − p∗io)xio∑m
i=1 xiopio
(6)
In (6) changes in quantities are weighted by optimal prices and changes in prices
are weighted by observed quantities. Clearly we could choose another set of weights
as shown below:
∑m
i=1 xiopio −
∑m
i=1 x
∗
iop
∗
io∑m
i=1 xiopio
=
∑m
i=1 (xio − x∗io)pio∑m
i=1 xiopio
+
∑m
i=1 (pio − p∗io)x∗io∑m
i=1 xiopio
(7)
Since the choice of weights is arbitrary we can sum both expressions and arrive
at the following equality:
12
∑m
i=1 xiopio −
∑m
i=1 x
∗
i p
∗
io∑m
i=1 xiopio
=
∑m
i=1 (xio − x∗io)(pio+p
∗
io
2
)∑m
i=1 xiopio
+
∑m
i=1 (pio − p∗io)(xio+x
∗
i
2
)∑m
i=1 xiopio
(8)
The first component in the RHS of (8) represents the percentage of observed
costs that can be saved through changing input quantities. Similarly the second
component in (8) represents the percentage of observed costs that can be saved
through changing input prices. The decomposition presented above can be seen in
the literature in other contexts. In particular the decomposition in (8) is a Bennet
indicator where quantity differences are evaluated at average prices and
price differences are evaluated at average quantities (see e.g. Chambers
(2002) or Grifel-Tatje´ and Lovell (2000, 1999) who used similar decompositions but
in a context of cost and profit change over time decomposed into a quantity effect
and a price effect). Though known, these indicators have never been used, to the
authors’ knowledge, in the context of decomposing economic measures of efficiency
as we do in this paper. The axiomatic theory on Bennet’s indicators was explored
by Diewert (2005) who showed that the Bennet price and quantity indicators satisfy
all of the 18 tests defined in his paper (continuity, identity, monotonicity in prices
and quantities, units invariance, linear homogeneity, to name but a few.)
Our approach, therefore requires solving just one cost minimisation problem for
each firm, where prices and quantities are assumed as decision variables, and then,
makes use of Bennet indicators to provide a decomposition of total cost savings
into those that can result from changes in prices and those that can result from
changes in quantities. Note that each one of the components in (8) can be further
decomposed into a radial and mix component in a manner which can make contact
with the traditional notions of radial technical and allocative efficiency in classical
cost decompositions. To proceed with this decomposition we first use the input price
and quantity targets obtained directly from (3) to compute radial components (x∗Rio
and p∗Rio ) representing respectively the feasible pro-rata change of input quantities
and prices. The remainder of the feasible changes in input quantities and prices
needed to attain the minimum aggregate cost are non-radial, reflecting mix changes
in input quantities and prices. The decomposition then obtained for input quantities
into a radial and a mix component of cost savings is shown in (9), and that obtained
for input prices is shown in (10).
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∑m
i=1 (xio − x∗io)(pio+p
∗
io
2
)∑m
i=1 xiopio
=
∑m
i=1 (xio − x∗Rio )(pio+p
∗
io
2
)∑m
i=1 xiopio
+
∑m
i=1 (x
∗R
io − x∗io)(pio+p
∗
io
2
)∑m
i=1 xiopio
(9)
∑m
i=1 (pio − p∗io)(xio+x
∗
io
2
)∑m
i=1 xiopio
=
∑m
i=1 (pio − p∗Rio )(xio+x
∗
io
2
)∑m
i=1 xiopio
+
∑m
i=1 (p
∗R
io − p∗io)(xio+x
∗
io
2
)∑m
i=1 xiopio
(10)
Where,
x∗Rio =

xio(maxi θ
∗
i ) if θ
∗
i ≤ 1 ∀i
xio(mini θ
∗
i ), if θ
∗
i ≥ 1 ∀i
xio all other cases
(11)
and
Where
p∗Rio =

pio(maxi γ
∗
i ) if γ
∗
i ≤ 1 ∀i
pio(mini γ
∗
i ), if γ
∗
i ≥ 1 ∀i
pio all other cases
(12)
That is, when all optimal θ∗i and γ
∗
i have values below 1 we obtain radial com-
ponents ( x∗Rio and p
∗R
io ) directly from the solution of model (3) by multiplying each
observed input quantity or price by the maximum of the optimal θ∗i and γ
∗
i , respec-
tively. In the unlikely event (since costs are being minimised) that all optimal θ∗i or
γ∗i are above 1, then the radial components will be obtained using the lowest θ
∗
i and
γ∗i values. Finally, where optimal θ
∗
i and γ
∗
i values span the range below and above
1 we have a mix of contraction and expansion of input quantities and prices which
means we have no traditional radial component and all savings are due only to mix
of input quantity and price changes.
5 Illustrative example
In order to illustrate our approach and contrast it with existing approaches for
computing and decomposing cost efficiency when units are not input price takers,
we use the illustrative example in Table 1, also depicted in Figure 1.
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Table 1: Ilustrative example
Unit X1 X2 Y P1 P2 C1 C2 Co = C1 + C2
A 3 2 1 2 3 6 6 12
B 3 2 1 4 0.5 12 1 13
C 2 1 1 2 4 4 4 8
D 6 4 1 1 2 6 8 14
E 1 2 1 2 3 2 6 8
Units E and C are technically efficient. Unit D has double the levels of inputs
of unit A to produce the same output and therefore is half as technically efficient as
A. Units A and B use the same input quantities, but buy them at different prices,
whereas units A and E use different input quantities but buy them at the same
prices. We therefore expect that units A and E are equally efficient in terms of
prices, when quantities are ignored, and that units A and B are equally efficient in
terms of quantities, when prices are ignored. In addition, unit C faces double input
prices compared to unit D and therefore should have half the price efficiency of D,
when quantities are ignored. As we shall see later, having the same prices or the
same quantities should result in the same optimal changes in quantities or prices,
but not necessarily in the same efficiency measures, when efficiency is expressed in
cost saving terms.
We argue in this paper that our proposed approach has mainly two advantages:
(i) it offers a clear decomposition of an overall scope for cost savings
into quantity and price gains, while existing approaches use concepts
of allocative efficiency that lack meaning in a context of non-exogenous
prices; and (ii) it can include explicit price relationships, in a mathemat-
ical model, providing price targets that are more realistic than those in
existing models. In what follows we will use the above example to illustrate both
these points.
5.1 A clear decomposition of overall cost savings
Figure 1 depicts the traditional representation of DMUs in the input-output
space, where DMUs E and C form the technical efficient frontier (they show the
minimum input quantities given outputs produced) and units A, B and D are tech-
nically inefficient. We also represent in this figure the isocost line of unit D, under
its observed input prices. The minimum cost for unit D, under its observed prices
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Figure 1: Isoquant and isocost for illustrative example.
is 4 and occurs at the input quantities and mix of unit C. Therefore the Farrell cost
efficiency of unit D (i.e. under its observed input prices) is given by 4/14 = 28.57%
and this measure can be decomposed into a technical efficiency measure (30%) and
an allocative efficiency measure (95.24%).
In Table 2 we show the results for the Farrell cost efficiency model (FM), the
Tone and Tsutsui (2007) model (TT), the Camanho and Dyson (2008) model(CD),
and our (PT) model, as resulting from (3) and decomposition in (8). Note that for
Camanho and Dyson (2008) we distinguish two approaches (i), where it is assumed
that the minimum price observed for each input across the units is actually available
to all units and so units are assessed in relation to this price vector which normally
would not have been observed at a single unit, and (ii) where it is assumed that only
observed combinations of prices are possible and each unit is assessed in relation
to all observed combinations of prices and the set giving it the lowest aggregate
input cost is chosen. Note also that efficiency values shown in Table 2 are not
directly comparable, since existing approaches decompose efficiency scores whereas
the PT approach developed in this paper decomposes cost savings (and therefore
inefficiency). Note however that efficiency scores can be read as potential for cost
savings since an efficiency score of 80% means that costs can be reduced to 80%
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of observed levels, meaning that costs can be reduced by 20%. We decided not to
convert values to a common basis because the multiplicative or additive nature of
decompositions would not be easily seen if we have done such a conversion.
Table 2: Results from various approaches
A B C D E
Observed Cost 12 13 8 14 8
FM Min Cost 7 5 8 4 7
Targets (x1, x2) (2, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (2, 1) (2, 1)
Technical eff 60% 60% 100% 30% 100%
Allocative eff 97.22% 64.10% 100% 95.24% 87.50%
Farrell Cost Eff 58.33% 38.46% 100% 28.57% 87.50%
Min Cost 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
TT Targets (C1, C2) (1.8, 2.4) (1.8, 2.4) (1.8, 2.4) (1.8, 2.4) (1.8, 2.4)
Technical eff 60% 60% 100% 30% 100%
Price eff 62.50% 100% 56.25% 100% 52.50%
Allocative eff 93.33% 53.85% 93.33% 100% 100%
Cost Eff 35% 32.31% 52.50% 30% 52.50%
Min Cost 2 2 2 2 2
Targets (x1, x2)* (1, 2) (1, 2) (1, 2) (1, 2) (1, 2)
CD (i) Targets (p1, p2) (1, 0.5) (1, 0.5) (1, 0.5) (1, 0.5) (1, 0.5)
Farrell cost eff 58.33% 38.46% 100% 28.57% 87.5%
Price eff** 28.57% 40% 25% 50% 28.57%
Cost Eff 16.67% 15.38% 25% 14.29% 25%
Min Cost 4 4 4 4 4
CD(ii) Targets (x1, x2)* (2, 1) (2, 1) (2, 1) (2, 1) (2, 1)
Targets (p1, p2) (1, 2) (1, 2) (1, 2) (1, 2) (1, 2)
Farrell cost eff 58.33% 38.46% 100% 28.57% 87.5%
Price eff** 57.14% 80% 50% 100% 57.14%
Cost Eff 33.33% 30.77% 50% 28.57% 50%
Min cost 2 2 2 2 2
PT Targets (x1, x2) (1,2) (1,2) (1,2) (1,2) (1,2)
θ1 0.333 0.333 0.5 0.167 1
θ2 1 1 2 0.5 1
Targets (p1, p2) (1, 0.5) (1, 0.5) (1, 0.5) (1, 0.5) (1, 0.5)
γ1 0.5 0.25 0.5 1 0.5
γ2 0.1667 1 0.125 0.25 0.1667
Potential savings due to quantity changes 25.00% 38.46% -9.38% 53.57% 0.00%
Potential savings due to price changes 58.33% 46.15% 84.38% 32.14% 75.00%
Total potential savings 83.33% 84.62% 75.00% 85.71% 75.00%
Cost efficiency 16.67% 15.38% 25.00% 14.29% 25.00%
* quantity targets in the CD approach are for the second stage models as the first stage targets are those from the
traditional cost efficiency approach (FM)
** We replaced Market efficiency by price efficiency in the CD approach for ease of comparison
Results in Table 2 show that under the Farrell cost efficiency model (FM) unit
C is overall cost efficient, and the remaining units have unit C as their benchmark
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for cost minimisation, except unit B (since the price of input 2 for unit B is 8 times
lower than the price of input 1, the cost minimising point for unit B is point E and
not point C). This approach assumes that prices are exogenous, and as a result the
fact that unit’s C prices are twice those of unit D is not reflected in the efficiency
score of this unit.
Approaches TT, CD and PT assume that prices can be to some extent influenced
through managerial actions. Under these approaches units C and E are the most cost
efficient units (they are shown equally efficient under TT, CD and PT approaches
in Table 2), even though no unit shows a cost efficiency of 100%. More generally,
these approaches rank in Table 2 the units in the same way in terms of overall cost
efficiency. However, the units are not ranked the same way on each component of
overall cost efficiency by all the approaches. For example, the TT approach identifies
unit E as the least price efficient (i.e. with largest scope for savings by adjusting
input prices), whereas under the CD approaches and our (PT) approach unit C is
the one showing lowest price efficiency or highest potential to reduce costs through
price changes (which is an intuitive result as unit C is the unit showing highest prices
of inputs). In addition, the TT model and our approach (PT) identify for unit E
that the only way to reduce costs is by changing prices, while the CD approaches
do identify cost savings due both to input mix and input price changes, even if
target quantities for unit E in the second model of the CD (i) approach are equal to
observed input quantities.
We shall use unit B to illustrate why our approach provides a clearer decompo-
sition of cost savings than the CD and TT approaches. Consider first the CD(ii)
approach, where for unit B, results in Table 2 show that savings of nearly 70% (down
to 30.77%) of observed aggregate cost of inputs can be achieved. These savings are
disaggregated into the following components:
• Reducing costs down to 38.46% of observed level and this is derived through the
Farrell cost efficiency model (1). These cost savings are achieved by changing
input quantities from (x1, x2)= (3, 2) to (1, 2), which is the optimal combina-
tion of inputs under the observed prices (4, 0.5) (see results of FM model in
Table 2) ;
• Reducing the Farrell cost value obtained from (1) further down to 80% of its
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value. This can be obtained by assuming that the input prices of unit D can
be adopted. Thus these savings are achieved if prices change from (4, 0.5) to
(1, 2). But the model solved for these prices identifies also optimal quantities,
which are (2,1).
These optimal quantities are, however, disregarded in the CD (ii) approach (as
well as in the CD (i)) as all cost changes from the Farrell minimum cost to the overall
minimum cost are interpreted as market efficiency. Therefore there is no component
of the cost efficiency measure of the CD approaches that encapsulates changes in
the quantity of inputs required to achieve minimum aggregate cost of inputs. This
approach, however, did identify a component of inefficiency for unit B associated
with input price changes which the TT approach failed to identify.
Indeed, the TT approach identifies for unit B only two sources of inefficiency
(technical and allocative) and considers it price efficient. Technical efficiency is
identified in the TT approach through a traditional technical efficiency model, and
its value is 60% (see Figure 1), meaning that the unit can save 40% of actual costs if
it reduces input quantities pro rata to 60% of observed levels. Price and allocative
efficiency are defined in a cost space (as defined in Figure 2), where inputs costs
(of technical efficient quantities) are represented on the axis. Units that are on the
’technical’ frontier of this cost space representation are deemed price efficient (and
such is the case of unit B). However, at the point where unit B is located costs are
not minimum and it would need to change the costs from (C1, C2)= (7.2, 0.6) to
(1.8, 2.4) to become efficient in terms of cost. These changes imply a change in
costs to 53.85% of technically efficient costs. The latter are achieved by changing
the mix of costs from point B to point D. Note, however, that movements from B
to D (which under the TT approach are called allocative efficiency) can be achieved
either by changing prices and/or changing input quantities or both (as we are in a
cost space cost savings can be achieved by savings in quantities and/or prices). Yet
these changes are not disentangled in the TT model. Clearly, if reduction in costs,
via changing the mix of technically efficient costs, is achieved through a change in
prices the allocative efficiency will indeed reflect price efficiency. Therefore the true
price efficiency is not entirely captured by the price efficiency component of the TT
approach.
Our proposed (PT) decomposition, while identifying the same minimum aggre-
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Figure 2: Cost production technology of Tone and Tsutsui (2007) for illustrative
example.
gate input cost as the CD(i) model, provides a decomposition that clearly disen-
tangles savings that accrue from changing quantities and savings that accrue from
changing prices. It suggests that to be overall cost minimizing unit B should change
its input quantities from (3, 2 ) to (1, 2) and its input prices from (4, 0.5) to (1,
0.5). Therefore overall cost savings of 84.62% of observed cost can be partitioned
into 38.46% obtained from changing input quantities and 46.15% from changing
input prices.
The example in Table 2 demonstrates how our approach can capture more clearly
both the scope for efficiency savings and its decomposition more accurately than
existing approaches. Under the PT approach cost savings can be negative, as it
happens for unit C, meaning that quantity targets in fact imply a rise in costs when
assessed at average prices. This rise is however compensated for by the cost gains
obtained from changing prices so that overall the unit can save 75% of its aggregate
costs by changing quantities and prices together.
We show in Table 3 the decomposition of the potential quantity gains and price
gains into a radial component and a mix component for the PT model, to illustrate
the advantages of pursuing such a decomposition.
In Table 3 it is clear that for units A, B, C, and E the potential savings due to
quantity changes can be obtained by changing the mix of inputs rather than changing
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Table 3: Price and quantity cost gains decomposed into radial and mix components
Total quantity radial quantity mix quantity Total price radial price mix price
A 25.00% 0.00% 25.00% 58.33% 41.67% 16.67%
B 38.46% 0.00% 38.46% 46.15% 0.00% 46.15%
C -9.38% 0.00% -9.38% 84.38% 56.25% 28.13%
D 53.57% 39.29% 14.29% 32.14% 0.00% 32.14%
E 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 75.00% 50.00% 25.00%
them radially. On the contrary, savings for unit D can be obtained by changing both
the input quantities pro-rata and their mix. Unit C is the one showing the highest
impact on cost due to changes in the mix of input quantities (since its observed cost
increases by a percentage of 9.38%). Note that this unit has observed quantities of
(2,1) and targets under the PT approach are (1,2), which means a complete reversal
in the mix of quantities of inputs used to secure the output level of this unit.
Cost gains due to price changes, in Table 3 happen for units B and D only as a
result of mix changes, and for the remaining units as a result of both radial and mix
price changes. Unit B shows the highest cost gain accruing from a change in the
mix in prices, since observed prices for this unit are (4, 0.5) and optimum prices are
(1, 0.5). These mix changes reflect solely the need for this unit reducing the price
of input 1, while keeping the price at which input 2 is secured.
In summary, the above shows that the decomposition we propose is more appro-
priate than those found in existing approaches dealing with savings attributable to
input price and quantity changes when units are not price takers. The decompo-
sition proposed in this paper reflects the fact that when units are not price takers
price and quantity optimization are simultaneous. Therefore it does not make sense
to optimise quantities for observed prices as done in other approaches and thereby
deduce savings due to quantity changes and deduce residually ’allocative’ efficiency.
Optimal quantities at observed prices may not be optimal for optimal prices and
allocative efficiency as traditionally defined makes no sense when units are not price
takers. In addition, our decomposition still allows the differentiation between cost
gains that accrue from reducing quantities and prices in a radial way or in a way
that mainly implies a change in the mix of quantities and/or prices.
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5.2 Modelling price relationships
In the previous section we showed that our proposed model can provide a clear
decomposition of total scope for savings into those attributable to quantity and to
price changes. The model developed is however a general one, which put forth for
the first time the implicit mathematical modelling of price relationships of some
existing models (like those of Camanho and Dyson (2008)), opening the avenue for
further price modellization.
In this section, we show how our model can identify the scope for savings through
the introduction of additional constraints on prices that may avoid target prices
that are not reachable or which are unreasonable. For example, under the CD (ii)
approach some units need to raise some input prices to be price efficient (e.g. in
table 2 unit B should reduce the price of input 1 from 4 to 1, but increase the
price of input 2 from 0.5 to 2). This is clearly counter intuitive from a perspective
of cost minimisation. This situation arises because the CD(ii) approach considers
an intensity variable (zj) associated to each unit j rather than intensity variables
associated to each input i. This is equivalent to consider the existence of trade-offs
between input prices. In some circumstances this can indeed be the fact (e.g. if 2
inputs are bought from the same supplier, a reduction in the price of one of them may
imply an increase in the price of the other), but one cannot expect that substantial
increases in factor prices are reasonable in a context of cost minimisation. Even if
one accepts the existence of such trade-offs one may not accept price increases, and
therefore a suitable modification to model (3), when zij are replaced by zj, is to
impose further constraints on price targets to avoid them to increase (γi ≤ 1).
Additional restrictions on factor prices can also be generalized to situations where
price and quantities are linked in some way (as in the case of price discounts for large
quantities bought from a supplier). For example, assume that the price of a certain
input i cannot decrease below observed price (pio) unless the company orders a
quantity higher than Q, in which case a quantity discounts of k% will apply. In
order to model this situation in model (3) one could add the following constraints:
pi = pio− k%piobi, and xi ≥ Qbi, where bi is a binary variable (note that pi = γipio).
Such flexibility in capturing restrictions on input prices and linkages between prices
and quantities are not available in existing approaches addressing the issue of cost
efficiency under varying input prices.
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To illustrate how our model can cope with additional price constraints, we have
chosen to solve model (3) imposing convexity on factor prices (i.e. zij = zj for
all i) and simultaneously imposing limits on factor prices, which cannot increase
above observed levels and cannot decrease below 80% of observed levels (this level is
arbitrary, but is used here for illustrative purposes only). Such additional constraints
take the form: αi ≤ γi ≤ 1 in model (3). The results from this modified model are
shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Results from model (3) with α1 = α2 = =0.8 and zij = zj for all i
A B C D E
Obs cost 12 13 8 14 8
Min cost 5.6 5 6.4 4 5.6
Target (x1, x2) (2, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (2, 1) (2, 1)
θ1 0.667 0.333 1 0.333 2
θ2 0.5 1 1 0.25 0.5
Target (p1, p2) (1.6, 2.4) (4, 0.5) (1.6, 3.2) (1,2) (1.6, 2.4)
γ1 0.8 1 0.8 1 0.8
γ2 0.8 1 0.8 1 0.8
Potential savings due to input quantity changes 37.50% 61.54% 0.00% 71.43% 11.25%
Potential savings due to input price changes 15.83% 0.00% 20.00% 0.00% 18.75%
Total potential savings 53.33% 61.54% 20.00% 71.43% 30.00%
Cost efficiency 46.67% 38.46% 80.00% 28.57% 70.00%
With these additional constraints two units show a price efficiency of 100% (B
and D), while under the CD(ii) approach only unit D would be 100% price efficient.
The constraints imposing limits on price changes resulted in several units being
required to reduce their input prices down to 80% of observed levels (A, C, and
E), as seen in the optimal γ∗i factors. Note however, that this reduction does not
translate necessarily in a percentage cost gain of 20%, unless the unit is efficient in
quantity terms (see unit C).
The above example shows that our approach can identify total savings that are
more realistic than existing approaches, by limiting the variations that can indeed
happen on input prices. Results in Table 4 identify higher cost efficiency values for
all the units, based on a more reasonable assumption regarding factor price changes.
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6 Conclusion
In a considerable number of cases in real life, markets are not perfectly competi-
tive and DMUs may have some degree of control over prices.This paper has addressed
the issue of computing and decomposing cost efficiency when DMUs being assessed
are not strictly input price takers. It is assumed DMUs could gain by manipulating
simultaneously, to the degree possible, input prices and quantities. The approach
proposed puts forth for the first time a DEA model that optimizes prices and quan-
tities simultaneously. This reflects more appropriately than previous approaches the
fact that the units being assessed can have scope to decide and therefore perform
well or poorly both on the choice of input/output quantities and on exploiting such
flexibility as there may be on unit prices. Further, the model proposed is a general
model that can be modified to include different types of restrictions on prices, to
capture local conditions faced by a unit such as bounds on price changes or links
between individual input prices and quantities.
The paper offers a suitable decomposition of the potential cost reductions be-
tween those attributable to potential input quantity adjustments and those at-
tributable to input price adjustments. It is argued within this paper that when
prices are not fixed the traditional concept of allocative efficiency loses its mean-
ing. Therefore the decomposition to be made on total cost savings pertains to the
savings that can be achieved through quantity changes and the savings that can
be achieved through price changes. No existing approach in the literature isolates
these two components so clearly when both quantities and their prices can vary
simultaneously.
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